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GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME METAPHORS*
Jonathan Simont
INTRODUCTION
In an era when historic ambitions to fuse law and the
social sciences have so often been frustrated,' I believe we
should approach cognitive science with two impulses. First, we
should have a great deal of skepticism toward the "normal
science" posture of this field.2 Second, we should borrow as
many of its considerable insights as possible. The publication of
Steven Winter's A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind
provides those of us in legal studies with a windfall in both
respects.' Winter, who came to cognitive science through
reflection on his own experience in litigation, harbors few of
the normal science longings of the discipline. At the same time,
he reports a broad range of the findings of the cognitive science
research community and does so in the context of a critical
reading of twentieth century American jurisprudence.
* @2002 Jonathan Simon. All Rights Reserved.
t Jonathan Simon is Professor of Law at the University of Miami Law School.
He is currently completing a book on the role of crime in the restructuring of American
governance since the 1960s. Presented at "Cognitive Legal Studies: Categorization and
Imagination in the Mind of the Law," Brooklyn Law School, October 26-27, 2001
1 Jonathan Simon, Law after Society, 24 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 143 (1999)
2 Cognitive science shares the unfortunate trait with political science that it
seems to be begging its scientific status every time it speaks its name, a disability not
shared by economics or physics. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 10 (1962).
3 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
(2001).
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Winter's cognitive reading of law can be usefully applied
beyond the classic jurisprudential territory of making sense of
judicial interpretation. In recent work, I have argued that
crime is becoming a model "problem" for governance in
American institutions. This is more than a matter of election
rhetoric, although that is telling in a democracy. Crime and
fear of crime have become privileged terms by which the needs
of individuals and communities are represented. We can speak
of crime, in this sense, as a metaphor, a construct from one
domain, the law of public wrongs, that is transferred into a
wide array of other domains and makes visible new truths
about those domains. As law and society scholars have shown,
law frequently transfers to popular discourse and to the self-
interpreting activity of non-legally trained people.' Governing
through crime points to a more specific phenomena, the
metaphoric use of crime by people with the power and
responsibility to help narrate the uses of power for themselves,
their agents, and their subjects.'
Part I of this Article draws on cognitive science to
explore the role of metaphors in the domain of political reason.
Part II then takes up a specific example of the use of metaphor
in the law making process, President Johnson's statement
issued along with his signing of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,7 the law that began more than
thirty years of federal legislation. Part III draws a political
inference from cognitive science and suggests we move from
metaphors revolving around crime to ones involving the fight
against cancer. If the productivity of certain ideas and
rationalities for law and governance is rooted in their cognitive
' See generally Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME
CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 171-90 (George Fisher & Lawrence
Friedman eds., 1997); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late
Modern America, 25 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1111, 1113 (2000).
5 See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STUDIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
6 On organizational narratives see CHARLES BRIGHT, THE POWERS THAT
PUNISH: PRISON AND POLITICS IN THE ERA OF THE "BIG HOUSE," 1920-1955 at 15 (1996);
JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS 1890-1900 at 9 (1993).
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 502, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
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effectiveness, as Winter argues, opposition must marshal its
own cognitive strategies.
I. GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME AND ITS COGNITIVE
DIMENSION
In his deeply insightful book, Moral Politics,9 pioneer
cognitive scientist George Lakoff uses crime discourse as one of
the clearest examples of his claim that underlying
contemporary American politics are competing metaphors of
the nation as family. Conservative politics is animated by a
metaphor of the nation as a family with a stern and
disciplinary father as its leader." To the political advantage of
conservatives, they have clearly identified the centrality of this
metaphor and made it an explicit part of their public appeal."
Liberal politics, although it tends to hide its moral
commitments, is no less rooted in a metaphor of the nation as a
nurturing family with a nurturing parent at its head.
Lakoffs model helpfully explains why crime has loomed
so large, albeit in slightly different form, to both conservatives
and liberals. Crime figures largely in conservative politics for
several powerful reasons that mark what cognitive scientists
would call "radial categories."' First, it exemplifies the
disciplinary father's fundamental claim to power and the
necessity of reproducing it even with violence. Without his
coercive capacity, the stern father as leader implies that the
inherently sinful pull of undisciplined human nature will lead
the weaker members of the family/nation into crime and
violence of their own more vulnerable parts (children, women,
minorities, the poor). Not surprisingly, conservatives have
offered the punishment of crime as the main form of domestic
8 GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES KNOW THAT
LIBERALS DON'T (1996).
I1d.
10 Id. at 33.
"Id. at 19.
12 Id. at 7-8; WINTER, supra note 3, at 72-74. As Winter lays out in some detail,
radial categories map the way meaning can be extended from the central examples of
the type (e.g., cardinal or blue jay for bird) to a whole range of quite different examples
that are also grouped within the same broad category (for birds, hawks, penguins,
ostriches). As a larger model of meaning, radial categories represent an alternative
theory to the dominant rationalist approach in Western science and philosophy.
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government and made their promise to punish crime their
prime appeal.
Second, the substantive rules of criminal law (at least
those noticed by popular culture) exemplify the simple
commands that form the disciplinary father's preferred
technology of power. The strict father speaks in the language of
rules backed by the threat of punishment. Conservative
majorities in Congress and in the state legislatures have
likewise made new criminal laws their preferred response to
social problems while attacking regulation and private
litigation as oppressive and counter-productive responses.
Third, the act of punishing is understood to be the
privilege and responsibility of the father and is critical to his
rule as father. Crime, in this sense, has a certain Durkheimian
inevitability.13 If the strict father is going to be able to exercise
the power to punish, and in so doing reproduce that power,
there must be crime to discover and confront. However, one can
no longer be as confident as Durkheim that crime and
punishment will produce a common emotional response; one
that gives substance to "society" as a collective moral
sensibility.
Liberals have often seemed to be playing catch up on
crime and punishment, but on Lakoffs account this is an
illusion driven by their own loss of contact with the moral and
family dimension of politics." In fact, the war on crime
metaphor was pushed first by the Johnson Administration
when it sought to implement a federal improvement program
for local law enforcement along the lines of the Great Society
model of social science expertise and liberal reform objectives.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, liberal members of Congress
and the state legislatures supported and initiated crime
legislation."
Following Lakoff, one can see the nurturing family in
the policies most avidly advanced by liberals in the crime field
including gun control, strict treatment of domestic and child
" EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 63 (1984).
14 LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 18.15 Edward Kennedy's co-sponsorship with Strom Thurmond of the legislation
that authorized the shift to sentencing guidelines in the federal courts is a case in
point. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCK DowN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE
OF CRISIS 50 (1999).
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abuse, recognition of hate crimes, and new quasi crimes like
sexual harassment in the work place. Crime is an issue for the
nurturing family, not as an inevitable war between good and
evil that must go on in each household (as it is for
conservatives), but as a threat that late modern conditions pose
to the actual safety of the family in their homes, in their
schools, and in their neighborhoods.16 Because of this focus,
liberals have tended to be somewhat more supportive of police
(perceived as capable of providing preventive control) and
somewhat less supportive of punishment (especially the death
penalty). At the same time, liberals have been enthusiastic
about moving the policing of crime into the family, the work
place, and the school.
Winter's A Clearing in the Forest will undoubtedly
compel legal scholars to take stock of the success of cognitive
science over the last three decades in producing a rigorous
science that at the same time is not anchored in classic
rationalist epistemology. Within cognitive science it may serve
the purpose of historicizing a mode of analysis that (like most
structuralisms) tends to celebrate the stability of determinants
rather than change.' Almost all of Winter's examples are
focused on legal change and the role of cognitive processes in
moving legal rules through a process of paradigm shift. Unlike
the literary reading of the metaphor, Winter's cognitive
analysis shows metaphors not merely as signs that a new set of
intentions is reshaping the law, but as tools of change itself,
structures that do the work of legal reasoning.
In the remainder of this Article, I draw on both Lakoffs
reading of crime in moral politics and Winter's studies of the
role of cognition in legal reasoning to examine the role of crime
as a governmental metaphor. Legal reasoning relies upon
metaphors not simply as adornment to judgments but as ways
of providing a circuitry of knowledge and power that bring fact
16 See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CoNTEmPoRARY SOCIETY (2000).
17 Lakoffs reading of politics, for example, focuses us on the compelling force
of moral identity in building political majorities. But from this perspective it is all too
easy to see the victories of the New Right in 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1994 as inevitable
products of the deep cultural conservatism of the white majority in America. Yet what
then needs explaining is the success of the New Deal model of political solidarity in the
face of a cultural morality even less eroded by the sheer velocity of change in the
information age.
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and doctrine into a productive relationship. In a similar way,
crime today functions as the principal metaphor of political
reason.
Crime in this regard frames the broader role of
regulatory power. Consider one of Winter's major examples,
Justice Holmes' famous "free trade in ideas" metaphor in his
Abrams v. United States"5 dissent. In his majority opinion for
the Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States,9 Holmes
endorsed a far less protective standard for subversive speech,
analogizing it to falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater. This
is a powerful example for Winter because it is so obvious once
he points to it that Holmes has relied on striking metaphors in
both opinions. In Schenck, the source domain is behavior likely
to panic people in a setting where that could easily become
very dangerous or even lethal."0 The target domain of
subversive speech is mapped in a way that makes government
intervention seem natural and valid. In Abrams, Holmes drew
his source from economic exchange to map the target domain of
subversive speech. In this new setting, government
intervention would be presumptively invalid and unnecessary.21
The metaphor in Schenck is really a metaphor of crime.
Falsely yelling fire in a crowded theater would almost certainly
have been treated as a serious crime (at a time when deadly
fires in such places were all too common), perhaps even murder
if deaths occurred. Moreover, the example could almost have
come from a case or hornbook discussing the problem of
"abandoned and malignant heart" murder, a common law
theory of murder liability premised on the moral culpability of
one who deliberately takes a huge risk to the lives of others for
no socially redeeming purpose.
The marketplace of ideas metaphor, in contrast, offers a
picture of speech operating in a very different governmental
is 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); WINTER, supra note 3, at
271.
19 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); WINTER, supra note 3, at 270.
20 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
21 Winter argues that the free trade in ideas metaphor is less a creative tour
de force than a quite conventional example of a conduit metaphor, i.e., one where ideas
are objects inside a mind that functions as a container. Winter argues that the
metaphor does much of the doctrinal work of the new Holmes test, bringing over from
the source domain of economic activity "a systematic set of entailments that supersedes
the limitations of the older free speech model." WINTER, supra note 3, at 272.
1040 [Vol. 67: 4
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME METAPHORS
context, not crime but business. If speech is more like a
business transaction than like a violent crime, the problem of
governance remains but is placed in a very different position.
What cognitive science calls conceptual metaphors
form the building blocks of more specialized and culturally
specific devices.
Unlike literary metaphors, conceptual metaphors have
their most significant effects not in the initial transplant of an
image from one domain to another, but in the entailments that
the metaphor produces. If life is like a journey, there must be
obstacles, vehicles, and objectives.' If speech is like a
marketplace of ideas, then speakers are like entrepreneurs, the
public are consumers, and the role of the government is both to
assure the health of the market and the well being of
consumers faced with inordinately powerful producers.' For
Winter's analysis of law, the key lies in "idealized cognitive
models" deployed in legal reasoning. These models, like the
marketplace of ideas, do more than invoke a literary
experience. Cognitive or conceptual metaphors provide a map
through which people can know and act on, for example, unruly
speech.' Crime functions as something similar which we might
simply call governmental metaphors, that is, those metaphors
that work not simply to transplant a series of meanings from
one domain to another but through that and other processes to
transmit forms of power and knowledge from one domain into
another.
Governing through crime metaphors may likewise have
had largely political objectives but its entailments alter the
way we know and act on the nation as a body politic. Perhaps
its most important entailment has been the construction of the
crime victim as an idealized citizen subject. Much follows from
this in a representative democracy with a popularly elected
law-making body. Although victims as such are rarely
mentioned in the text of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, in comparison to its more recent descendants, the
1968 law initiated a circuitry of knowledge and power that has
MId. at 13.
'Id. at 16.24Id. at 272.
Winter contrasts this approach to metaphor to the influential theory of
Donald Davidson. See WINTER, supra note 3, at 55.
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made the crime victim one of the most visible faces of public
need before Congress and state legislatures. In a real sense,
the victims who have come to dominate the narrative of more
recent crime legislation were produced as governmental
subjects by the 1968 law and its entailments.
If the citizen is a victim, than the task of government is
to fight crime. The nation is territorialized as a street in which
crime takes place. The ideal forms of the state become the
police officer and the prison where the substantive rationality
of punishing crime is allowed to have its full sway.
II. REIMAGINING THE NATION THROUGH CRIME:
METAPHORS OF THE SAFE STREETS ACT
This act will help to lift the stain of crime and the shadow of fear
from the streets of our communities.
-President Lyndon Johnson, June 19, 1968.26
Crime victims are only the most recent and currently
most dominant of a whole panoply of idealized political subjects
that have entered (and more rarely left) the stage of American
political development. At earlier points in the history of the
United States, idealized political subjects, such as the yeoman
farmer, the freed slave, the industrial worker, and the
biologically vulnerable consumer, helped not only in
assembling enduring political majorities but in imagining the
proper scope and approach of government. At various times in
our nation's history, each of these subjects has been the focus
of great waves of both federal and state legislation. Yeomen
farmers, for example, were the idealized subjects at the center
of a series of laws that Congress enacted over the last two-
thirds of the nineteenth century dealing with the settling of
public lands in the territories of the United States.
These subjects were more than ideological fictions. Each
idealized political subject included real features of the
26 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 1968 PUB. PAPERS 725, 727 (June 19,
1968) [hereinafter Johnson Statement].
27 See generally MARION CLAWSON, THE LAND SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF LAND USE AND LAND TENURE
(1968).
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American population that were being highlighted by historical
conditions (changing technologies, political regimes, etc.). They
also represented projects of social construction. Each ideal
identifies general features of a population that make it capable
of the democratic ideal of self governing, but the other side of
these virtues are vulnerabilities that require governmental
responses.
Today it is in the experience of criminal victimization
and (much more commonly) the imagined possibility of
victimization that the political community and its governable
interests are being redefined in law making. It is the outlines
of this victim subject, projected by advocacy groups, the media,
and law itself, that frames the purposes of legislation and the
features of the subject that this legislation must take into
account. Indeed, to the extent that earlier ideals seek to
recuperate their political currency, it is through a narrative
representation of them in crime victim mode.
Thus, in an era when civil rights is little attended to by
Congress, hate crimes have emerged as the dominant focus for
those lobbyists and legislators loyal to that cause.' At a time
when regulation of consumer industries is increasingly
voluntary, laws creating new kinds of safety crimes, e.g.,
driving while speaking on a hand-held cellular phone, are
growing.
Crime legislation is part of a dialog whose main
interlocutor is the crime victim and those who speak for
victims. The following quote comes from a speech delivered by
former Attorney General Janet Reno to a meeting of victim's
rights advocates, but most of our recent Attorney Generals and
many other politicians have said remarkably similar things.
I draw most of my strength from victims for they represent America
to me: people who will not be put down, people who will not be
defeated, people who will rise again and again for what is right...
you are my heroes and heroines. You are but little lower than the
angels. 29
Jeffrey Gettleman, Ex-Klansman Convicted in 1963 Alabama Church Blast;
Crime: Life Term is Given in Bombing that Killed Four Black Girls and Galvanized the
Civil Rights Movement, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at Al; Marlon Manuel, 1963
Birmingham Church Bombing; Guilty on All Counts, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 2,
2001, at Al.
Bruce Shapiro, Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims'Rights Amendment
2002] 1043
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Notice that one could substitute the words "yeomen farmers,"
"freedmen," or "industrial workers" without any strain. This is
the best description possible of what it is to perceive an
"idealized political subject."
As with the great pieces of Reconstruction and New
Deal legislation, the Safe Streets Act merits recognition at
three levels: as a solidifying political victory for a new
governing coalition in American politics; as a critical growth
point for a set of specialized knowledges and technologies of
power about governing crime, i.e., crime, criminals, and
victims, but also law enforcement, courts, and correctional
agencies; and as defining a new set of privileged subjects for
government, including victims, state law enforcement, courts,
and correctional systems. Such a subject embodies the major
struggles that endanger the freedom and well-being of all
citizens. Not surprisingly, once a political culture has adopted
yeomen farmers, industrial workers, or crime victims as ideal
political subjects, one would expect to find them valorized in
popular culture, pedagogy, and certainly political speeches as
heroes or even quasi-divine figures.
A. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
The dominance of crime legislation over the imagination
of lawmakers began with the adoption of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.30 The Act was enacted
June 6, 1968 with only four senators and seventeen
representatives voting against it.3 The "omnibus" legislation,
as it self-advertised, consisted of several distinct elements,
although with the presumption that all would contribute to the
substantive titles of "crime control" and "safe streets."
is a Bad Idea, 264 THE NATION, Feb. 19, 1997, at 11.
30 Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 201-406, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) [hereinafter Safe Streets
Act].
. RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 14 (1969).
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1. Title I. Federal Funding for Law Enforcement
Research & Development
Title I was the core of the original Johnson
Administration bill, first introduced in 1967, which envisioned
a major investment of federal dollars in state and local law
enforcement.32 This section embodied Johnson's strategy for
handling the crime issue that he had already seen in the
campaign of his 1964 opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater. The
bill would provide funds for new equipment, new training, and
even some new law enforcement officers, but tied to an agenda
of substantive reform and improvement in policing, courts, and
corrections.
Title I retained the Johnson Administration's objective
of funding, but structured it through a form of "revenue
sharing" that diluted the federal role in setting the agenda.
Title I funds would be available directly to state and federal
law enforcement. Governors and mayors would have direct
roles in seeking and distributing funds. Rather than directing
reform, the federal government would act as a grant reviewer,
making sure that the proposals conformed to formal features of
planning and research driven strategies. The final bill
authorized over 400 million dollars in federal revenue, a
number to be multiplied many times over by subsequent
legislation.33
2. Title I. Repudiating the Warren Court's Criminal
Procedure Jurisprudence
The most controversial provisions of the Safe Streets
Act were those establishing rules of evidence for criminal trials
in federal court that clearly conflicted with Supreme Court
doctrine on confessions.' The most famous provision allowed
32 Safe Streets Act §§ 201-406. For Johnson's thinking about the funding part
of the Act see, ROBERT DALLEi, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES
1961-1973 at 409 (1998).
Safe Streets Act § 502.
3 Ironically, these provisions have proved largely immaterial. Starting with
the Ford administration, it has been the policy of the Department of Justice to ignore
Title II. When a portion of the law was finally tested by the U.S. Supreme Court in
2000, it was at the prompting of private public interest lawyers and an ultra-
2002] 1045
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
statements of a suspect in custody to be admitted at trial even
if taken without the benefit of explicit warnings such as those
required by Miranda v. Arizona," so long as the trial judge
deemed them "voluntary."6 The language of Title II was the
product of a coalition of conservatives from both parties. Many
of them had long resented the Supreme Court's interference in
school segregation and in law enforcement. Liberals in both
parties opposed this part of the bill as unconstitutional. The
new standard, if read literally, had the effect of mandating
federal courts to ignore several new criteria that the Supreme
Court had established on top of the traditional voluntariness
test, a position ultimately validated by the Court itself in
2000."7 President Johnson's dislike for this aspect of the law led
him to veto the version of it passed by Congress in 1967. But
the increasing violence of 1968, surging crime, riots, and
assassinations, compelled him to accept what he acknowledged
to be a flawed bill.
3. Title III. Wiretapping and Eavesdropping
Some states, like New York, permitted wiretapping but
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 made it illegal to
intercept telephone communication.38 Since 1934 the Attorney
Generals had sought, without success, permission from
Congress to do wiretapping in criminal cases. 9 In the
meantime the FBI operated on a tacit understanding that this
did not apply to national security." The Kennedy
Administration introduced several bills calling for
conservative appeals court. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
348 U.S. 436 (1966).
The statute did allow that trial judges should consider such warnings or the
failure to deliver them in evaluating voluntariness,
37 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The law also purported to
establish by statute that a suspect could be held for at least six hours by the police
before being brought to an arraignment before a judge without jeopardizing any
confession taken from the suspect during that time due to simply to failure to bring the
suspect to arraignment more promptly.
38 48 Stat. 1103 (1934); see also VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 72
(1971).
39 Navasky, supra note 38, at 72.
40 Id.
1046 [Vol. 67: 4
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME METAPHORS
authorization of wiretapping, but with increasing safeguards.41
President Johnson's Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, became
the first Attorney General to oppose wiretapping, a position on
which he influenced the President.42 In his 1967 State of the
Union address, President Johnson called for the outlawing of
all public and private wiretapping except for the narrow needs
of national security.43 In its original proposals for a major crime
bill in 1967, the Johnson administration had sought legislation
that would have used federal law to place restrictions on state
and local use of wiretaps." The legislation the President signed
in June of 1968 for the first time authorized state and federal
law enforcement to seek wiretap warrants from federal courts
and set internal standards to govern the granting of such
warrants.
Critics of the wiretapping provisions, including then
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, argued that it gave the President
too much leeway to define national security and thus made
wiretapping possible against domestic political opponents, like
the civil rights movement, or anti-war protesters.45 Critics also
questioned whether wiretapping was truly responsive to public
concern about armed robberies and violence in the streets
which rarely involved the kind of ongoing planning and
organization that wiretaps could realistically hope to capture
in time to prevent crime.46 Most proponents would have sided
with the sentiments expressed by Robert Kennedy a few years
earlier when as Attorney General he had supported
wiretapping only on the grounds that law enforcement truly
believed it would help them prevent and punish crime.47
4
'Id. at 75.
DAVID HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER AND FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 38 (1970).
4Id.
4 MALCOLMl M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DIEmMA: FEDERAL
CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968-1978
at 41, 45 (1980).
45 HARRIS, supra note 42, at 36.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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4. Title IV. Gun Control
Liberals had their chief victory in the establishment of
the first federal laws regulating gun sales on a nation-wide
basis. The law set up a federal licensing structure for gun
dealers, requiring them to keep information on the purchases
of weapons, banning hand gun sales by mail order, and
banning sales altogether to a range of presumptively
dangerous subjects including dishonorably charged veterans,
felons, and the insane.48 The provision was originally defeated,
but the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy by gunfire in
a Los Angeles hotel days before the vote on the overall law
resulted in reconsideration and passage of the gun control
provision.
B. Crime and the National Political Debate
Contemporary observers in the late 1960s saw the crime
issue as the most significant challenge in decades to the liberal
domination of domestic policy. This was especially true of
President Johnson, who understood the cultural contradictions
of the Democratic majority as much as any politician in the
twentieth century. LBJ famously quipped on the signing of the
Civil Rights Act of 196449 that he had "just delivered the South
to the Republican Party for a long time to come."50 But losing
the South might have been worth it, in exchange for locking up
a progressive coalition in the Northeast, Midwest, and
California.
Johnson intuitively understood how dangerous violent
crime was to the post-New Deal coalition he was seeking to
reestablish. Barry Goldwater had invoked crime in the streets
in his 1964 landslide defeat, but LBJ had succeeded in turning
the campaign on Goldwater's own extremism not Democratic
permissiveness. LBJ recognized that crime was driving a
wedge through the Democrat's urban coalition, peeling off
white voters to the suburbs and the Republican Party. He told
pro-civil rights union leader Walter Reuther that "nearly every
48 Safe Streets Act § 902.
4' 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
E.J. DIoNNE, JR., WHYAMERICANs HATE POLITICS 81 (1991).
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white man in this country would be frightened if he thought
that the Negroes were gonna take him over.""
The specter of violent criminal assaults by blacks on
whites and their property surely invoked the worst of these
white fears of losing privilege. Almost from the start of
Johnson's own term, public anxiety about riots and crime was a
constant in the news Even the New York Times, a paper not
easily swayed by short term popular interests, documented the
political rumbling of this issue in the headlines of the mid-
1960s: "Hasidic Jews Use Patrols to Balk Attack";1
2
"Philadephia Police Using Dogs to Curb Violence in Subways";
"[Mayor] Wagner Orders A Night Patrol on All Subways";54 and
"Fear of Muggers Looms Large In Public Concern Over
Crime.""
The apparent rise in violent crime, primarily armed and
unarmed robberies and aggravated assaults, was concentrated
in the big cities that were the traditional anchors of the New
Deal style of government with its emphasis on regulation and
expert decision makers. This kind of one-on-one crime was
linked to the riots and anti-war protests that had become
common for the first time in a century during the mid-1960s.
Both types of events were associated with blacks and students,
two groups that seemed to be often identified with a liberal
federal approach to government.
While the Safe Streets Act was enacted during the
presidential campaign to succeed him, Johnson had not waited
until the last minute to turn to this issue. From the start of his
term he had pursued a consistent strategy consisting of three
elements. First, he spoke frequently and forcefully about his
concern for the harm crime was causing and the absolute
necessity of combating it. He fostered the creation of expertise
about crime and the criminal justice system. Most famously,
his President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Criminal Justice began work in 1965 and
61 GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE 20
CENTURY 290 (2001).
12 Reprinted in 7 THE NEW YORK TIMEs, CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE GREAT
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES SERIES 219 (1978).
5 Id. at 221.
Id. at 224-25.
55Id. at 230.
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issued reports in 1966 and 1967.56 Based on their work, he
proposed in 1967 to launch a grant in aid program to fund local
units of government struggling to reduce crime.
Other forces were at work as Congress took up the
proposal in 1967 and 1968. Richard Nixon, seeking the
Republican presidential nomination for 1968, was steadily
flogging the crime issue. In 1968, George Wallace, then known
for his confrontation with the Kennedys over the integration of
the University of Alabama, which he resisted vigorously,
campaigned as an independent candidate for president,
emphasizing crime as a dominant issue in his appeal to
northern voters. Both Nixon and Wallace argued that the crime
problem was ultimately a problem of government. Both viewed
the federal courts as the major villains, especially the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, which had impeded
the efforts of police and prevented prosecutors from using
evidence. The concern over increasing violence in American
cities was evident in Nixon's view that the courts "have gone
too far in weakening the peace forces against the forces of
crime."
To its liberal critics, the Safe Streets Act represented a
moment of reactionary regression on the part of government.
British journalist Richard Harris, writing in the New Yorker,
described it bluntly as "a piece of demagoguery devised out of
malevolence and enacted in hysteria."59 It is not difficult to see
why they reacted so strongly. LBJ's "Great Society" strategy to
fight poverty and reform local governance was still in its
infancy both administratively and as a successor to the New
Deal approach to government. Along with the administration's
landmark civil rights decisions, these new programs
engendered strong resistance from both traditional Republican
opponents of expanding the New Deal and Southern Democrats
defending segregation. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 represented the first fruits of the union
between those forces in Congress; a union that has dominated
American politics ever since.
' PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
57 MALCOLM FEELEY & AUSTIN SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA 41 (1980).
THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 51, at 266.
"9 RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 14 (1969).
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LBJ was keenly aware of all this when he signed the
Safe Streets Act. It was a dramatic moment. Johnson had
already withdrawn from seeking a second term and was
attempting to negotiate a cease fire to the Vietnam War.
Johnson vacillated on whether or not to sign the legislation,
waiting until the last possible day to sign the bill before it
would have become law without his signature. He asked for the
comments of each cabinet agency and was able to state that
none had advised him to veto it.
Johnson's official statement on signing the bill provides
ready evidence of his ambivalence. He described the law on
balance as doing "more good than bad."' He expressly rejected
the wiretapping and police interrogation portions of the law,
and following the advice of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, he
made clear that they would not be federal policy for the
remainder of his administration. He touted the enormous
commitment of federal funds to reforming local law
enforcement, avoiding mention of the law's new block grant
structure, although it represented the first major step away
from the style of Great Society legislation he had pushed
through Congress earlier.
When he attempted to justify placing his signature on
the law, however, Johnson turned to a series of powerful
metaphoric images. The opening line of his statement deployed
one of the most common cognitive metaphors, the idea of a
"journey" narratively applied to something very different in life
like a love affair, a career, or in this case the development of a
law.61 "The Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968 has had
a long journey,"6 2 the President stated. Johnson recounted his
efforts, beginning in his very first year as an elected President,
to appoint a national crime commission and apply its expert
findings to the wealth and power of the federal government in
the name of aiding local law enforcement." To this end,
Johnson had introduced legislation in Congress in February
1967, shortly after the publication of the Crime Commission's
Johnson Statement, supra note 26, at 725.
61 Id.
62 id.
63id.
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Report. "Now," Johnson announced, "almost 500 days later, the
legislative process has run its full course."'
The journey image is prologue to a whole series of
additional metaphors that seem aimed at elaborating his
governmental act of signing the bill into law.
C. The War on Crime
The most prominent metaphor is military imagery. The
"war on crime" has become so common an idea that it is easy to
forget it is a metaphor, arguably one of the most successful
governmental metaphors of the twentieth century. Although it
is widely associated with President Nixon (he actually declared
the war on drugs), President Johnson used it in public
statements throughout his presidency. In March 1967, before a
White House conference with 500 state, city, and private law
enforcement and corrections specialists, the President spoke of
"our war on crime."6' The Presidential statement given when he
signed the Safe Streets Act bristled with a whole series of more
specialized metaphors.
Recounting the origins of the law in the first bill he had
introduced to Congress in 1967, Johnson described his
legislation as a call upon Congress to "strike a sure and swift
blow against crime in America."66 In this image, one variation
on the war on crime theme, the lawmakers are treated as a
physical body. Today, thirty years into the development of
governing through crime, we are apt to follow that metaphor
through to an image of corporal or even capital punishment, or
hand to hand combat. Johnson turned it into his Great Society
vision, imagining the limbs as great streams of federal money
flowing to increase the capacity of local law enforcement. The
provision of federal funds and expertise would allow state and
local communities to "plan, organize, and mount a concerted
and effective attack on crime."67
In his closing paragraph, Johnson returned to the war
on crime metaphor, imploring local officials to: "Support the
64Id.
6r DALLEK, supra note 32, at 409.
6Johnson Statement, supra note 26, at 725.
V Id.
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policemen, the law enforcement systems and to move promptly
to support the policemen, the law enforcement officers, and the
men who wage war on crime day after day. . . ."' Here the
metaphor has shifted to one more consistent with our current
imagery. The war on crime emerges as a war on criminals (and
by implication those who look like they might be criminals,
primarily young minority men in the inner cities). Police are
depicted as soldiers engaged in active combat.
The war on crime metaphor provides a clear example of
what I call governmental metaphors. What is being transferred
from one domain (war) to another (law enforcement) is
specifically a vision of the role of government. Someone more
enamored of normal science than I might talk about cognitive
political science, or political cognitive science. It seems
justifiable, at any rate, to view metaphors like these as
operating in the realm of political reason. 9
The origin of war as a metaphor for recasting
government developed out of the American experience of World
War II. This was a war of total mobilization in which
economies of great societies were largely given over to total war
production. In that sense, it has had no real parallels. All the
U.S. wars since 1945 have been conducted while maintaining
high civilian living standards. Nonetheless, the images of a
war on poverty, war on crime, war on cancer, war on drugs,
and war on terrorism continue to invoke the image of an
empowered central government mobilizing the nation and its
resources to undertake systematic measures against an enemy
that poses a mortal threat.
1. The Street
Running through the Johnson war on crime metaphor is
the image of streets. The idea of titling the administration's
major 1967 legislative initiative on crime the "Safe Streets Act"
came from Housing and Urban Development Secretary Joseph
8 Id. at 728.
69 Political reason is used here in Michel Foucault's sense of a rationality
proper to the problem of government itself and not simply mapping that terrain from
theology or economics. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in 3 ESSENTIAL WORKS
OF FOUCAULT, 1965-1984 at 201 (James D. Faubion ed., 2000).
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Califano. ° One of the administration's leading liberals,
Califano wanted to emphasize that anti-crime measures were
not goods in themselves but ways to "restore public and private
safety."7' In the name of the Act and in the language of
Johnson's signing statement, streets come to operate as a
metonymy for American society generally, and especially the
great American cities. Johnson's metaphor expressed not
simply an ideology or a set of beliefs but a strategy for retooling
liberalism to govern the changing urban landscape, the
unstable "habitus" of the great cities on which Johnson's
Democratic majority remained dependent. 2 Johnson claimed,
"I sign the bill because it responds to one of the most urgent
problems in America today-the problem of fighting crime in
the local neighborhood and on the city street."
73
Crime was defined as one of America's "most urgent
problems," but Johnson's strategic message was embedded in
the images that followed: "fighting crime," "local
neighborhood," "city street." Fighting crime is an entailment of
the war on crime metaphor. What do armies do at war but
fight? However, the fight is neither nowhere nor everywhere, it
is in two places, "the local neighborhood" and "on the city
street."
These two locations point to subtly different terrains.
Local neighborhoods, to be sure, contain city streets (and in
many older cities they are mostly streets), but the referents of
local and neighborhood suggest something culturally more
specific. By multiplying "local" against the semantically close
"neighborhood," the Johnson statement invokes the intimacy of
private residences and the immediate surrounding area
including your "block," perhaps a neighborhood school, and
park. The term "city" modifying streets in the next image, "city
street," gives us one final clue. By implication, the "local
neighborhood" is not city. Today it is specifically "suburban"
70 DALLEK, supra note 32, at 407.
71 Id.
7 In this regard he shared the sentiment of many of the more liberal
Democrats who had voted for the law because to do nothing courted a "real possibility
that the people will lose their faith in the government's ability to protect them"
HARRIS, supra note 59, at 99 (quoting Senator Philip Hart, a liberal Democrat from
Michigan, and an opponent of the crime bill, regarding the reasoning of the Act's
Democrat supporters).
Johnson Statement, supra note 26, at 725.
1054 [Vol. 67: 4
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME METAPHORS
but in 1968 the term still coded many of the outlying
neighborhoods within city limits but differentiated from the
urban core designated colloquially as "the city." If local
neighborhood codes the private, the residential, the local, and
often parochial, we can assume that "city street" codes
something far more specific than municipal roadways, these
are downtown, public, business, and shopping streets.
The combination of these images produces two separate
but related dynamics. One is a classic public/private split that
has long been observed as central to liberalism as a form of
political thought.4 Throughout the statement, Johnson seems
to tack back and forth, referencing "homes and families" in
contrast to streets. The gun control provisions of Title IV are
extolled in the statement as a partial step toward "the
protection of our homes and families."75 Likewise, Johnson is
concerned that wiretapping and eavesdropping could become
abused and threaten the privacy by producing
a nation of snoopers bending through the key holes of the homes and
offices in America, spying on our neighbors. No conversation in the
sanctity of the bedroom or relayed over a copper telephone wire
would be free of eavesdropping by those who say they want to ferret
out crime.76
In contrast, when Johnson returns to streets at the end
of the statement, it is to invoke a day-by-day war raging in
those streets between forces of crime and forces of law and
order. Thus, while the private spaces, neighborhoods, hones,
and offices are to be protected not only against crime but
against law enforcement's own excesses, the streets are to be
scoured by an unforgiving war.
Across this divided terrain Johnson wants to offer his
party a strategy. Crime was an urgent problem, but specifically
in the way it was undermining the Great Society on two of its
most crucial anchors. On the one hand, there was the largely
urban working class that had been made into a new kind of
74 On the public private split in liberal thought, see generally Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
75 Johnson Statement, supra note 26, at 726.
76 Id.
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middle class by New Deal policies and post-War affluence, and
the organized interests represented by those downtown streets,
municipal unions, banks, and insurance companies with large
real estate holdings, large public institutions like museums
and universities, and the large corporations that sustain them.
On the other hand, there was, by 1968, the civil rights
community as a representative of black America.
a. "stain" and "shadow"
This political strategy is most powerfully expressed in
what, in my reading, is the central metaphoric construct of the
statement. In language widely quoted by newspapers at the
time, President Johnson summarized his judgment to sign the
legislation thusly: "I believe this measure, despite its
shortcomings, will help to lift the stain of crime and the
shadow of fear -from the streets of our communities."77 The term
"stain" carries with it a powerfully evocative image of
degradation. Consider a standard set of dictionary definitions:
1. a discoloration produced by foreign matter that has penetrated
into or chemically reacted with a material. 2. a natural spot or patch
of color different from that of the basic color, as on the body of an
78animal. 3. a permanent impairment to one's reputation; stigma.
The three definitions suggest a possible metaphoric
pathway, from stain that is caused by a foreign matter, to one
that is a natural blemish, to one that is a moral blemish. Stain
in a cognitive sense communicates several very basic
metaphors that cognitive science treats as more or less cross-
cultural and trans-historical. As Winter notes, these metaphors
are generally associated with the body and the experience of
being embodied and are progressively transposed on more
abstract entities. 79 The most basic metaphor in the stain
metaphor is light/dark as a metaphor of good and bad.
Cognitive scientists have traced this pattern in a wide variety
' Id. at 727.
78 THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1282 (Jess Stein ed., 1975)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter DICTIONARY].
79 WINTER, supra note 3, at 22-32.
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of cultures and across racial lines.8" Stain builds on the
light/dark metaphor and adds the sense of pollution associated
with many stains. In other words, stains are usually treated as
minor tragedies not simply because the discoloration is
aesthetically unattractive, but because the source of the stain
itself, food or drink consumed in the past, or bodily fluids, are
invested with a culturally negative meaning that is also, one
suspects, found in many societies.
Crime as a source of "stain" is an easy metaphoric leap
as suggested by the third dictionary definition. That crimes
were supposed to "stain" the offender literally is an image that
authors have drawn on repeatedly. One of the best known
examples being Shakespeare's Tragedy of MacBeth in which
Shakespeare uses it twice for both his criminal protagonists."'
When MacBeth emerges from murdering Duncan, Lady
MacBeth points to the blood staining his hands and commands
him: "Go get some water, and wash this filthy witness from
your hand."8 2 Two acts later in one of the play's most haunting
scenes Shakespeare modifies the metaphor from a stain of
visibility to one of smell. Lady MacBeth is shown in a sleep
walking state trying unsuccessfully to wash the smell of blood
from her own hands: "Here's the smell of the blood still. All the
perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. 0, 0, O!"'
Shadow of fear has much the same structure. Fear does
not literally cast a shadow any more than crimes leave stains. 8
The metaphor is another variant of the light/dark system in
which positive attributes are light and negative ones are dark.
Fear darkens what, one's sentiments, one's prospects, one's
countenance? These darkenings are also not good, but they do
not necessarily communicate permanent alteration of
appearance or reputation in the same way that stains tend to.8
8o Indeed race itself may be an extension of this metaphor of darkening or
staining as making something morally less worthy.
81 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, in THE RWVERsIDE
SHAKESPEARE (G. Blakemore Evans ed., 1974).
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1382.
To be sure, the development of DNA technology changes that dramatically.
Now the metaphor of crime leaving a stain is becoming an organic reality for an
astounding variety of crimes that leave even flakes of skin or bits of saliva behind (like
mail fraud).
's Infamously, Time Magazine admitted to darkening a picture of O.J.
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By combining two metaphors with great similarities at
the most general level, the Johnson statement produces a
hybrid governmental metaphor that is historically and
culturally specific.
These images, however, are further situated by the
phrase "streets of our communities."5 It is the street that is
stained by crime and shadowed by fear and the street is held
out as a privileged subset of community. Street is immediately
linked to community, setting up a form of metonymy in which
the whole community is represented by the image of the street.
On one level this means those communities defined by their
streets-i.e., the great dense urban centers-especially their
employed middle classes, are being "stained" by crime. They
are losing not only their population base and economies but
their moral standing in the polity. At the same time
respectable citizens, the victims shadowed by street crime,
have every incentive to exit those unsafe streets, a move
subsidized by liberal federal governments to a tune far more
generous than the Great Society spending on the poor.
Crime and fear, stain and shadow, seem to pick out
different audiences; those who are morally stigmatized by
crime and those who are made afraid by it. Johnson, a New
Dealer at heart, was speaking to two important pieces of his
quickly fragmenting Great Society coalition. The first piece was
that composed of minorities and especially the urban black
communities of the North whose annual summer riots, more
than any single factor in the mid to late 1960s, seemed to doom
his programs with their own stain of failure and worse. Yet
Johnson had invested a great deal in urban black communities.
By throwing his support fully behind the Civil Rights Act of
1964, he had cut his party's ties to many of its traditional
white southern supporters. The "maximum feasible
participation" element of his Great Society poverty programs
was aimed directly at the community action orientation of the
civil rights movement and also represented an effort to create
Simpson for the cover of a 1994 issue detailing accusations of murder against him. See
Deirdre Carmody, Time Responds to Criticism Over Simpson Cover, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 1994, at A4.
Johnson Statement, supra note 26, at 727.
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direct federal support for movement organizations cut out from
the establishment partisan spoils system. 7
Johnson's historic gamble depended on the moral
capital of the civil rights movement to hold the support of
northern white voters. As long as blacks were perceived as a
victim class, Johnson could demand significant federal
remedial effort as an effort to correct historic injustice. But
crime, both armed street robberies that surged during the
1960s and rioting, was reversing that moral polarity. That is
why the riots were so damning; they took the image of violence
and theft in the streets largely rooted in the habits of young
men and defined whole neighborhoods as violent and crime
prone. As soon as blacks were seen as morally stained by
crime, Johnson had every reason to fear his policies would
come to seem ineffectual and possibly responsible for the
problem. Johnson's message to black voters and to the liberal
wing of his party was that only serious efforts to actually
reduce crime could remove the moral stain that was clouding
the issues of the civil rights movement.
The second piece of the coalition Johnson seemed to be
addressing were the urban middle classes who in the late
1960s were abandoning traditionally prestigious city
neighborhoods for new suburbs in large numbers. At the time,
a lot of attention was focused on the role of school
desegregation in encouraging this white flight, but few doubt
that fear of crime was a major factor and one that influenced
attitudes88 toward schools and integrated neighborhoods
generally. This population was demographically weighted
toward the immigrant families of the great European
immigration waves from the middle of the nineteenth century
through the adoption of exclusionary legislation in the mid-
1920s: Italians, Irish, Jews, Germans.89 Many of them were
members of the new middle class whose dependencies on
higher education incentives and high wage jobs rather than
private capital made them traditionally loyal voters for the
Democratic Party.
DALLEK, supra note 32, at 80.
DIONNE, supra note 50, at 94.
'Id. at 214.
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Fear of crime was beginning to build a major wedge
between these voters and the liberal wing of the Democratic
Party whose commitment to civil rights came to seem to many
in this population as indifference to their fear of black
criminality. Lifting the shadow of fear meant policies aimed at
inducing this population to remain within the cities, if they had
not moved yet, or to at least remain politically supportive of
the urban agenda if they had already removed themselves to
the suburbs.
2. Law Enforcement
A second strand of the war on crime metaphor that runs
through Johnson's statement is that of law enforcement as the
embodiment of the way government serves the people. Just as
streets become a metonymy for society, police become a
metonymy for the state as a whole. Throughout the text,
Johnson uses law enforcement to mean, at a minimum, the
entire criminal justice process. In a complex movement,
Johnson simultaneously offers law enforcement as the solution
to the community beset by crime and fear of crime (stain and
shadow) and as a special victim class of its own that needs
special federal attention. The end result is to mark both
citizens fearful of crime and state and local law enforcement as
requiring a privileged status as federal subjects.
While later presidents would conflate themselves with
local law enforcement (and Congress has followed suit by
federalizing much local crime), Johnson saw the federal
government largely as a facilitator for the improvement and
reform of law enforcement. True to his New Deal heritage,
Johnson emphasized the expert knowledge behind his program.
The job of the executive was to bring together on a national
basis the kind of expertise that was unavailable at the local
and state levels.
My program was based on the most exhaustive study of crime ever
undertaken in America-the work of the President's national crime
commission. That commission-composed of the Nation's leading
criminologists, police chiefs, educators, and urban experts-
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spotlighted the weaknesses in our present system of law
enforcement.
90
In touting the part of the Safe Streets Act that he liked
the most, the Great Society-like action grant program was
designed to motivate the innovation and reform Johnson
promised would "strengthen the sinews of local law
enforcement-from police to prisons to parole."9' Here the
statement deploys one of the oldest of governmental
metaphors, one so old that it is inscribed as a dictionary
meaning of sinew. Literally, sinew is the Greek term for
tendon, the connective tissue that lies between bands of muscle
and key bone structure.92 Metaphorically, sinew has long stood
for the "source of strength, power, or vigor."93
The metaphor offers a subtle response to the by then
loud criticism from the right that crime in the streets was a
response to the liberal administration's failed policy of
rewarding morally and socially bad behavior in the name of
fighting poverty. By locating the problem of crime in the
weakness of state and local law enforcement, Johnson denied
both that there was an essential weakness in American society
and that the federal government was the source of it. On the
contrary, the federal government alone could lead the kind of
reconstruction of local power that would be necessary to make
American streets safe in the last part of the twentieth century.
The ambition was nothing less than reconstructing the power
of law enforcement at a molecular level. The federal role was to
collect a national base of expertise through the new National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (later the
National Institute of Justice) which the President referred to
as "a modern research and development venture which would
put science and the laboratory to work in the detection of
criminals and the prevention of crime.""' Federal money would
also flow to pay off college loans and attract a new college
educated work force into law enforcement, as well as open up
90 Johnson Statement, supra note 26, at 725.91Id.
2DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 1226.
'3 Id. The entry goes on to give as an example a political metaphor "the sinews
of the nation."
Johnson Statement, supra note 26, 726.
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new training and salary enhancements. In short, the war on
crime for Johnson looked a lot like a war on poverty with police
in the role of community development agencies.
One of the most consequential features of the Safe
Streets Act, revealed in the statement, is the intertwining of
police and citizens as victims. Police are held out as the party
that can most effectively prevent victimization. "But at a time
when crime is on the tip of every American's tongue, we must
remember that our protection rests essentially with local and
State police officers."" At the same time, law enforcement
would become the privileged subject of governance itself,
parallel to the citizen in the local community in relation to the
nation and its executive.
3. Governing the Streets
In the concluding paragraph of the statement, President
Johnson brought the whole constellation into view, the war on
crime, its territorialization into streets, the centrality of law
enforcement. He did this in a paragraph that addressed itself
to other governing officials.
Today, I ask every Governor, every mayor, and every county and city
commissioner and councilman to examine the adequacy of their
State and local law enforcement systems and to move promptly to
support the policemen, the law enforcement officers, and the men
who wage the war on crime day after day in all the streets and roads
and alleys in America.
96
The Safe Streets Act, as read by President Johnson, was
a call to reform governance, "State and local law enforcement
systems," a mandate from the federal government to state and
local leaders. The "war on crime" was situated between parallel
structures of repeated invocations of law enforcement and
streets. First comes the human element of law enforcement,
"policemen," "law enforcement officers," "men who wage the
war on crime day after day." Second comes the naming of
"Id. at 727.Id. at 728.
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"America" in an almost Whitmanesque elegy to its "streets and
roads and alleys."
Ill. IMAGINING AN ALTERNATIVE: GOVERNING THROUGH
CANCER
Winter' and Lakoff 8 are in agreement that there is
generally no law and reason without metaphor. Both treat this
as a feature of reason itself. Michel Foucault's concept of
governmentality, a condensation of "governmental" and
"rationalities" sheds a similar light on the relationship between
governance and reason. Foucault suggests that the task of
acting on the actions of others (government) is bound up with
ways of reasoning about governing." If governing through
crime and its metaphors is undesirable, it is not because they
fail the test of a fully transparent and democratic will
formation that is supplanted or distorted by crime and the
moral panic it gives rise to. From a governmentality
perspective, evaluation is difficult to separate from the
rationality of government itself that tends to define what is
knowable and more importantly to produce truth selectively
only in ways that are a byproduct of its own strategies of
intervention.
Both cognitive science and governmentality research
suggest that governing through crime and its metaphors can
only be contested with other metaphors and other ways of
rationalizing governance. American political culture has
produced a great many metaphors to govern by including the
yeoman farmer, the freed slave, and the exploited industrial
worker. The dominance of the crime victim today as a subject
of governance has not completely eclipsed any of these; they
remain deposits of power that can help change the trajectory of
governance.
I believe one of the most productive subjects of
governance is the problem of preventing cancer. Like crime,
"WINTER, supra note 3, at 64.
LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 7.
Foucault, supra note 69, at 201.
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cancer has always been a hot issue for Americans."' Beginning
at the end of the nineteenth century, a national discourse
about cancer emerged, as well as the nodes of a national
network of power and knowledge.10' After World War II, for a
variety of reasons, fear of cancer moved to the front of that
national legislative agenda. In this new phase, cancer was
primarily problematized as a preventable disease roofed in
unhealthy industrial practices of production and consumption.
Popularized by authors like Rachel Carson, this fear of a
cancer backlash from America's industrial affluence after
World War II gave rise to the modern environmental
movement. 102
Seeking to capture this growing energy, Richard Nixon
declared a "war on cancer" in 1971.13 Nixon was keenly aware
of the potential for the environmental movement to spawn a
new governmental rationality quite different from the
traditional focus on work place conflict between capital and
labor, one focused on the externalities of industrial production
in both the workshop and home. His war on cancer, however,
proved a pale effort compared to the far more politically
successful war on drugs.
If only for what it can teach us about our current
conjuncture, I propose that we re-launch the war on cancer as
an alternative metaphor to the war on crime, this time without
the restraints that guaranteed the war on cancer would remain
a small scale spending war compared to the governance
shaping war on drugs and crime that has continued through
three decades. Like violent crime, cancer invokes a deep fear
associated with that which cannot be prevented or treated once
it strikes. Moreover, like crime it arrests Americans across all
divides striking a common chord of dread and despair. In that
sense it offers something capable of mobilizing action across
society.
There is much, however, in the history of governmental
efforts to fight cancer that suggest it might not be an
improvement on crime. As Susan Sontag shows in her path
"0 See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE DREAD DISEASE: CANCER AND
MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE (1987).
101 Id. at 167.
'0 See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
,03 PATTERSON, supra note 100, at 35.
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breaking study of illness as a political metaphor, cancer has
often been associated with stigmatizing the victim." Moreover,
contemporary cancer treatment resembles the war on crime all
too much with remedies that are visibly harmful to the
patients and commonly fail to arrest the malignancy. Renewing
the war on cancer means moving back behind Nixon's
truncated war on cancer to the broader regulatory politics
inspired by fears of carcinogens in the food supply during the
1950s. The new war on cancer should return to the focus on
environmental causes of cancer (both behavioral and
industrial) that animated the legislation of the 1950s and
1960s. While the war on crime has focused almost exclusively
on punishing individual wrongdoers, this new war on cancer
would focus on the myriad practices that alter the risks of
cancer in humans and the potential to alter common practice to
reduce that risk. As a problem, preventing cancer offers a
mandate for the workplace, for the family, for consumption,
and for the state.
As a metaphor, a war against the causes of cancer
would carry entailments quite different than a war on crime.
The war on crime from as early as the 1968 Safe Streets Act
was visibly a war on criminals-those easily mistaken by the
police for criminals. This population was predominantly poor,
minority, and concentrated in poverty zones in the central
cities. The targets likely to emerge from a war on the causes of
cancer, like producers of significant carcinogens, are powerful
corporations with significant political and cultural resources to
compete in the production of knowledge and methods of
intervention. The war on crime and drugs has made the police
and the prison system the dominant model of winning. A war
on the causes of cancer would have to enter into the household,
into patterns of consumption, into lifestyle. The war on crime
has made violence the chief technology of power. A war on
cancer would quickly become a war of information in which the
production of knowledge about the causes and cures of cancer
would replace a top down law enforcement government with a
bottom up effort to spread and interpret the flow of cancer
information.
See generally SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1977).
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In short, it would quickly break out of the war metaphor
altogether and provide us with a model of governance itself.
Cancer, quite unlike crime, is defined as the failure of
regulation itself. If cancer replaced crime as a chief metaphor
for reshaping government, the deployment of these same
entailments on social problems could be expected to generate
unpredictable but quite different effects then crime. Schools,
for example, currently obsessed with mapping crime, drugs,
and break downs in discipline, might turn to teaching the
science of cancer biology, the environmental sources of cancer,
and the capacity of students to avoid major cancer risks like
smoking.
CONCLUSION
In retrospect the signing of the Safe Streets Act marked
the end of the Great Society era and the liberal pro-Civil
Rights dominance of federal policy. It would rapidly produce its
own theorists, political scientists Richard Scammons and Ben
J. Wattenberg, who published The Real Majority1" in 1970,
only two years after the Act and the Republican take-over of
the White House. The book used crime as the central example
of how the Democratic Party was in real danger of losing its
two generation long majority status by ignoring a profound
shift of its traditional supporters on a host of "social" issues
(including the race problem, abortion, family values, etc.).
Democrats, in their view, had to move fast to stop talking
about the root causes of crime and instead support tougher law
enforcement measures to repress existing criminals, even if
that trampled on Civil Rights concerns.
With remarkable speed, Democrats in Congress
followed suit. Richard Nixon introduced "numerous crime
proposals during his first year in office but had no control over
the legislative agenda since the Democrats held both houses of
Congress by large majorities and were not anxious to allow
Nixon to brand the crime issue effectively as his own. As the
1970 election approached, however, the Democrats rapidly took
up and enacted with little debate virtually everything on the
03 RIcHARD SCAMMONS & BENJAMIN J. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY
(1970).
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administration's list including "no-knock entry" and
"preventive detention" proposals for the District of Columbia,
measures that would have been considered far too extreme for
the Safe Streets Act." 6 On the campaign trail, liberal
Democrats sought to explicitly define their moral commitment
to rejecting crime. Edward Kennedy, running for re-election in
1970, told an audience at Boston University:
Those who seek change by the threat of use of force must be
identified and isolated and subjected to the sanctions of the criminal
law. They are the hijackers of the university... and like hijackers,
they must be deterred and repudiated .... Any person who lends
them aid and comfort, any person who grants them sympathy and
support, must share the burden of guilt.
1
U7
History would show that this rapid turn would not
restore liberals to their influence. Some would argue that they
never moved far or fast enough to the right. Once the game of
who could be tougher came to dominate, there was little chance
of outrunning the issue since each election cycle brought a new
crime bill with a new array of opportunities for one's
commitment to punishment to be tested.
Governing through crime has pushed America in two
directions that have had enormous consequences for the long
term governability of the society, both suggested
metaphorically in Johnson's signing statement of the Safe
Streets Act. The first is the rise of the "street" as the nexus for
a war on crime style of governance. Second is the extraordinary
emphasis this has placed on policing in managing virtually all
large organizations, public or private.
The Safe Streets Act made streets a metonymy for
society in general and public areas of large cities particularly.
In a metonymy, a part represents the whole, as when a scepter
represents the royal sovereign. As a governmental metaphor
(or metonymy), safe streets has had two different kinds of
effects. First, it has reinforced a portrait of streets in general,
and city streets in particular, as dangerous. Just as the phrase
"working mother" implies that the prototype mother does not
106 John Herbers, Democrats Shift to Right, in Line with G.O.P. on Crime
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1970, at A26.
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work, the "safe streets" project put the federal government's
imprimatur on the dangerousness of city streets. Although
already determined, the years (even months) after June 1968
would see a rapid dissolution of the central sectors of great
cities like Detroit, Cleveland, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and
Newark.
Second, in making streets the site for the war on crime,
the Safe Streets Act mobilized a major effort to reshape
American streets to make it easier to fight crime them. In this
sense the governmental metaphor of safe streets has
contributed to the (in my view ultimately undesirable)
transformation in the construction and, governance of the
urban environment. In a very real sense we live in the "safe
streets" imagined by the war on crime declared in 1968.08
Johnson's contrasting images of homes and
neighborhoods and streets has been reproduced in the
contemporary suburban landscape. A new kind of street
landscape has emerged in America since 1968 characterized by
super wide roadways designed for the rapid movement of
automobiles through an area and -the easy passage and
manipulation of emergency vehicles.1"9 These new landscapes
are replacing traditional neighborhoods in older cities and
intersecting the new "edge city" suburbs. In the suburbs one
finds segmented or even gated clusters of homes linked to
roadways designed for rapid transportation and the movement
of emergency vehicles rather than commerce in the old sense
that had dominated. The same kind of "safe streets" have
appeared in the inner cities as well, often in place of streets
damaged by the riots of the late 1960s.
But turning our cities and suburbs into "safe streets"
has had a significant effect on American middle class life. Some
contemporary urban designers have come to see these streets
as one of the sources of "social decline." Andreas Duany,
Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Beck, in a section of their
planning manifesto against "sprawl" titled "Safe Streets versus
Dangerous Streets," offer an unambiguous judgment against
this new terrain:
'08 There were earlier precedents to be sure.
109 See generally ANDREAS DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).
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The problem with current street design standards is not that
engineers have forgotten how to make streets feel safe but that they
don't even try. Streets that once served vehicles and people equitably
are now designed for the sole purpose of moving vehicles through
them as quickly as possible. The have become, in effect, traffic
sewers. No surprise, then, that they fail to sustain pedestrian life.1
0
An urban environment shaped around safe streets may
facilitate governing through crime but it creates profound
governance problems for families (how to drive and risk
manage the kids through an environment they cannot
negotiate until teen years at the earliest) and employers
(whose employees face formidable challenges in balancing work
and family at great distances).
As the last lines of President Johnson's statement
suggest, the link between the war on crime and the streets,
roads, and alleys of America are the police and law
enforcement agents who fight there on a day-by-day basis. The
major thrust of federal investments through the Safe Streets
Act was directed toward improving police and specifically to
equip them to take back control of the streets from rioters and
criminals. Much of that money went into technology aimed at
the street, including armored personnel carriers and other
paramilitary equipment.
The city re-imagined as its streets must be governed
more than ever by police. In communities of the affluent a
great deal of this policing is done by private services and by
exclusionary designs, like gated communities, aimed at making
it easier to identify strangers. In communities of the poor this
has meant public police and a vast penal system to remove
from the streets those captured by the police.
In the end, the Safe Streets Act did not lift the "stain of
crime" or the "shadow of fear" from American cities or their
streets. Instead, whole communities remained isolated from
the economic growth of the past three decades in large part
because of the stigma of being high crime areas. The vast
federal justice effort has encouraged this at every turn, for
example, by promoting drug courier profiles that define most
major cities in America as drug source or drug destination
"OId. at 64.
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cities. The shadow of fear has been generalized so that even
suburban landscapes seem threatening enough that millions of
Americans now feel safe only behind the wheels of SUVs.
There are signs of new politics that make governing
through crime its focus. Across American campuses and in
many minority communities, a movement against
incarceration is building momentum."' The securitization of
the school, workplace, and residential community is also
generating a backlash as American individualism becomes
affronted by a gated community world. Understanding how
crime metaphors have worked to shape governance can help
this growing resistance in two respects. First, by making
visible the way the metaphoric system frames action
possibilities, it becomes possible to challenge the entailments of
the crime metaphors in terms of their origins. Second, by
suggesting the necessity to promote new metaphors of
governance that can compete with crime in its symbolic
potency and global reach.
Fighting the causes of cancer is an example of an
alternative metaphor for governance that can compete with
and help undermine governing through crime. First, simply by
thinking about the causes of cancer as an alternative focus of
governance, the productivity of a metaphor like crime becomes
more visible. Like the causes of crime, the causes of cancer
provide a grid of concerns that are flexible enough to map onto
almost any topic of governance, including education, health,
the environment, or the family. Like crime, cancer provides the
stimulus of an always present but rarely visible threat that
demands governmental concern. Like crime, cancer is also
capable of stigmatizing its victims and thus a war on cancer
could become a war on cancer victims. But a serious war on the
causes of cancer would inevitably move beyond the current
obsession with controlling dangerous individuals and toward a
confrontation with dangerous practices, habits, and
technologies.
" See Bell Chevigny, Prison Activists Come of Age: In California Resistance to
Prison Expansion Builds on the Past, 271 THE NATION, July 24, 2000, at 1.
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